Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 14

Issue 3

Article 1

7-1-1997

The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism
John Hick

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Hick, John (1997) "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism," Faith and Philosophy: Journal
of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 14 : Iss. 3 , Article 1.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199714331
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol14/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGE OF
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
John Hick

A critique of responses to the problem posed to Christian philosophy by the
fact of religious plurality by Alvin Plantinga, Peter van lnwagen, and
George Mavrodes in the recent Festschrift dedicated to William Alston, and
of Alston's own response to the challenge of religious diversity to his epistemology of religion. His argument that religious experience is a generally
reliable basis for belief-formation is by implication transformed by his
response to this problem into the principle that Christianity constitutes the
sole exception to the general rule that religious experience is an unreliable
basis for belief-formation, thus undermining his central thesis. Plantinga's
and van Inwagen's defenses of the logical and moral permissability of
Christian exclusivism fail to address the problem posed by the existence of
other equally well-based religious belief-systems with equally valuable
fruits in human life. Mavrodes' discussion of polytheism, and his clarifying
questions about religious pluralism, are also discussed.

Many of us today who work in the philosophy of religion are in broad
agreement with William Alston that the most viable defense of religious
belief has to be a defense of the rationality of basing beliefs (with many
qualifying provisos which Alston has carefully set forth) on religious
experience. From the point of view of a Christian philosopher-as distinguished from a philosopher simply as such-there is however an obvious
challenge to this in the fact that the same epistemological principle establishes the rationality of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, etc in holding
beliefs that are at least partly, and sometimes quite radically, incompatible with the Christian belief-system. Belief in the reality of Allah, Vishnu,
Shiva, and of the non-personal Brahman, Dharmakaya, Tao, seem to be
as experientially well based as belief in the reality of the Holy Trinity.
Alston himself acknowledges this as "the most difficult problem for my
position'" and this view is reflected in the fact that a third of the
Festschrift recently published in his honor 2 is devoted to this topic.
Alston's own solution to the problem is (in briefest summary) that
since we have at present no neutral way of establishing which of the
world religions is right, and since our own religion is both theoretically
and practically satisfactory to us, it is much more reasonable for us to
stay with it than to switch to another. On analogy with the rival doxastic
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practices-Aristotelian, Cartesian, Whiteheadian etc-in terms of which
we construe the physical world, "In the absence of any external reason
for supposing that one of the competing practices is more accurate than
my own, the only rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of
which I am a master and which serves me so well in guiding my activity
in the world ... Hence, by parity of reasoning, the rational thing for a
practitioner of CP [Christian doxastic practice] to do is to continue to
form Christian M-beliefs [beliefs about God's self-manifestation to us],
and, more generally, to continue to accept, and operate in accordance
with, the system of Christian belief."3 Alston is here assuming that there
can be at most one 'true religion', so that the big question is, which of
the competing religious belief-systems is the true one ? But this widespread assumption is fatal to Alston's thesis that it is (with all the proper
qualifications and safeguards) rational to base beliefs on religious experience. For if only one of the many belief-systems based upon religious
experience can be true, it follows that religious experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is thus a generally unreliable basis for beliefformation. This is a reversal of the principle, for which Alston has
argued so persuasively, that religious experience constitutes as legitimate a ground for belief-formation as does sense experience. Further,
whilst it is possible that the doxastic practice of one's own community
constitutes the sole exception to a general rule, the claim that this is so
can only appear arbitrary and unjustified unless it is supported by good
arguments. And so William Wainwright, in his chapter in the Festschrift,
holds that "To be fully successful [Alston's defence of 'sitting tight'J
must form part of a persuasive cumulative case argument for the
Christian world-view" (188).
The arbitrariness of Alston's position is highlighted when we remember that if he had been born into a devout Muslim or Hindu or Buddhist
family he would, using the same epistemology, be equally arbitrarily
claiming that his Muslim, or Hindu, or Buddhist beliefs constitute the
sole exception to the general rule that religious experience produces
false beliefs! (Strictly speaking, since it would not then be the same Bill
Alston, one should say that when someone is born into a devout Muslim
etc family ... But this does not affect the point).
However Alston might at this point retreat to a fall-back position prepared in Perceiving God, where he describes the absence of neutral
grounds for preferring the Christian world-view as only a "worst case
scenario" (270). A more desirable scenario would be one in which there
are compelling metaphysical arguments for theism and in which in
addition "historical evidences give much stronger support to the claims
of Christianity than to those of its theistic rivals-Judaism and Islam"
(270). However Alston does not suggest that this better scenario actually
obtains. "Perhaps", he says in the end, "it is only in God's good time
that a more thorough insight into the truth behind these divergent perspectives [i.e. of the different religions] will be revealed to us" (278). His
fall-back position is thus a hope rather than a reality.
However, even if it were a reality it would still undermine Alston's
basic principle. For on his only-one-true-religion assumption the argu-

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM

279

ments and evidences establishing the truth of Christian beliefs would
thereby establish the falsity of the beliefs of other religions, at least in so
far as they are incompatible with Christian beliefs. And this incompatibility is clearly very considerable: God cannot be, for example, both personal and not personal, triune and not-triune, exclusively self-revealed
to the Jews, and to the Arabs, and so on. And yet religious experience
within the different traditions has produced these incompatible beliefs.
It thus follows as directly from Alston's best case scenario as from his
worst case scenario that religious experience is not generally a reliable
ground for belief. On the contrary, it follows equally inescapably from
either scenario that religious experience generally produces false beliefs,
with Christian experience claiming to stand out as the sole exception.
It therefore does not seem to me that Alston has met, or can without a
more radical adjustment meet, the challenge of religious diversity to his
experience-based apologetic. On the other hand, his central argument
that religious experience constitutes a valid basis for belief-formation
still seems correct, and indeed (in my view) constitutes the most valuable current contribution to the epistemology of religion. But would this
not be a much stronger contribution if the doxastic practices of the other
world religions could be seen as further instances of it rather than as
contradicting it ?
Fortunately there is a fairly obvious way to reconcile the two desiderata (a) that the principle that we properly form beliefs on the basis of our
experience applies impartially to religious as well as to sensory experience (subject in each case to possible defeaters), and (b) that this principle
holds impartially for non-Christian as well as for Christian forms of religious experience. This is by appealing to the distinction between
God/the Ultimate/the Real/the Transcendent an sich and that ultimate
reality as variously humanly conceived, and thus variously humanly
experienced, and hence variously humanly responded to in historical
forms of life. Such a recognition of variety in our human response to the
Transcendent depends upon the epistemological principle propounded
by St Thomas, "Things known are in the knower according to the mode
of the knower,"4 and developed in the modern world by Kant in a way
that has affected nearly all western philosophy since. In the case of religion the mode of the knower, i.e. the conceptuality in terms of which the
divine presence comes to consciousness, differs as between different
human religious cultures and epochs. I shall not develope the pluralistic
hypothesis further here, having done so elsewhere. 5 Alston himself discusses this Kantian option, but rejects it on the ground that it must be
seen "as a proposal for a reconception of religious doxastic practices,
rather than as a description and evaluation of those practices as they are.
It seems clear to me that most practitioners of one or another religion are
pre-Kantian .. They think that [their] beliefs embody true accounts of the
Ultimate as it really is in itself ... n I accept that this is so, but I suggest
that the alternative to some kind of religious pluralism is to leave unexplained the immensely significant fact that the other great world faiths
are as epistemically well based as Christianity; and also that they seem,
when judged by their fruits, to be morally on a par with Christianity.
/I
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The next essay in the Alston Festschrift, Alvin Plantinga's "Pluralism:
A Defense of Religious Exclusivism", affirms Christian exclusivism in
unqualified terms. His response to religious diversity is the straightforward claim that Christian beliefs are true and all beliefs inconsistent
with them therefore false. He does not offer any positive reasons for this
but thinks it sufficient to argue, negatively, that it is not morally reprehensible or epistemically out of order to adopt an exclusivist stance. To
be a religious exclusivist is, he argues, neither irrational, unjustified,
egotistical, intellectually arrogant, elitist, a manifestation of harmful
pride, self-servingly arbitrary, dishonest, or oppressive and imperialistic. His argument is characteristically thorough and elaborate, involving
among other matters the examination of four different senses of rationality and three different conceptions of justification. But what emerges at
the end is simply that Christians are free to be (as throughout Christian
history Christians have nearly always been) exclusivists in their attitude
to non-Christians. One is not "arrogant and egotistic just by virtue of
believing what I know others don't believe, where I can't show them
that I am right" (200); and one who believes that Christians are right and
non-Christians wrong has "violated no intellectual or cognitive duties or
obligations in the formation and sustenance of the belief in question"
(202). The scale of philosophical argumentation leading to this conclusion suggests that Plantinga supposes himself to be addressing the central issue between religious exclusivism and religious pluralism. But in
fact his argument has not even come within sight of the central issue.
Certainly, when people sincerely believe (whether rightly or wrongly)
that their own group has a monopoly of the final religious truth, they
are entitled to hold and propagate that view, so long as their so doing
does not harm others. And this applies impartially not only to evangelical Christians but also to evangelical Muslims, Hindus etc., and likewise
to much smaller and more recent religious communities such as
Christian Scientists, or Kimbanguists, or the followers of the Reverend
Sun Myung Moon, and so on. But to establish this principle is not to
have addressed the epistemological challenge of religious diversity.
Instead Plantinga is concerned to defend Christian exclusivism
against the moral indignation that it has sometimes aroused, and which
has sometimes been expressed in the contemporary philosophical and
theological debates. 7 He deflects this by defining exclusivism so narrowly that only people who are "rather fully aware of other religions" and
aware also "that there is much that at least looks like genuine piety and
devoutness" within them (196) are to be counted as exclusivists. He thus
ignores by stipulative definition the aspect of the Church's stance
through the centuries that has been expressed in the persecution and
murder of Jews, in violent crusades against Muslims, in the validation of
European imperialism, and in the often ignorant denigration of other
religions. As regards the latter, there are plenty of cases in Christian literature of theological exclusivism expressed in arrogant, proud, oppressive and/ or unthinking and unfair ways. But it is of course also true that
a knowledgeable, thoughtful and ethically sensitive Christian exclusivist, such as Plantinga himself, is morally as well as intellectually enti-
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tled to his exclusivist faith. But is this fact sufficient to dispose of the
problem of religious diversity?
Plantinga does however at one point take up an issue in the debate.
He refers to the fact, noted above, that religious allegience depends in
the great majority of cases on the accident of birth: someone born into a
devout Muslim family in Pakistan is very likely to be a Muslim, someone born into a devout Hindu family in India to be a Hindu, someone
born into a devout Christian family in Spain or Mexico to be a Catholic
Christian; and so on. The conclusion that I have myself drawn from this
is that a 'hermeneutic of suspicion' is appropriate in relation to beliefs
that have been instilled into one by the surrounding religious culture.
"Having thus noted that Ptolemaic [i.e. exclusivistl theologies tend to
posit their centers on the basis of the accidents of geography, one is likely to see one's own Ptolemaic [exclusivistl conviction in a new light. Can
we be so entirely confident that to have been born in our particular part
of the world carries with it the privelege of knowing the full religious
truth, whereas to have been born elsewhere involves the likelihood of
having only partial and inferior truth ?"8 The relativity of religious belief
to the circumstances of birth does not, of course, show that claims to a
monopoly of religious truth are unjustified; but it does I think warn us
to look critically at such claims. Plantinga's reponse is to point out that if
he had been born elsewhere, such as in Madagascar, he would have had
some different beliefs-for example, he would not have had the belief
that he was born in Michigan. And, he says, "the same goes for the pluralist. Pluralism isn't and hasn't been widely popular in the world at
large; if the pluralist had been born in Madagascar, or medieval France,
he probably wouldn't have been a pluralist" (212); but, he points out, it
does not follow that he is therefore not entitled to be a pluralist. This is
true; but how relevant is it ? One is not usually a religious pluralist as a
result of having been raised from childhood to be one, as (in most cases)
one is raised from childhood to be a Christian or a Muslim or a Hindu,
etc. Surely the cases are so different that the analogy fails.
The next Festschrift essay is Peter van Inwagen's "Non Est Hick".
Although this refers to Hick only in the title and the last sentence, van
Inwagen's account of religious pluralism seems to be loosely based on
my An Interpretation of Religion. He finds the whole idea offensive and
even perhaps contemptible: "the defense of religious pluralism", he
says, "has always been entirely rhetorical" (219). And so instead of
engaging critically with it he presents his own understanding of religion, adding however that "I do not expect this theory to recommend
itself to anyone who is not a traditional, orthodox Christian" (219).
van Inwagen outlines Western Augustinian-Calvinist orthodoxy: God,
the primordial catastrophe of the Fall, redemption by the death of God's
Son, the choice of Israel, the divine founding of the Catholic Church. As
to the world religions, "they are the work of human beings, and their
existence and properties are not a part of God's plan for the world"
(225)-although God may nevertheless make use of them, as He makes
use of other human acts and products that He has not willed. van
Inwagen makes much of the contention that whilst there are Christians,
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Buddhists, Muslims, etc., there are no such reified entities as Christianity
or Buddhism or Islam, for these are 'compression' words naming abstractions. He holds that "the concept of a 'religion' is a piece of misdirection
intended to advance what I shall call the 'Enlightenment agenda' " (231),
which he associates with religious pluralism. It is ironic that Wilfred
Cantwell Smith's classic work The Meaning and End of Religion (first published in 1962 and widely influential ever since") deconstructed the concepts of 'religion' and of 'a religion' as modern western creations which
distort the reality of human faith throughout the world, this deconstruction leading to Cantwell Smith's well-known pluralist conclusion!
van Inwagen also makes much of the 'uniqueness' of western
Christian civilization. But of course every civilization, including our
own, is unique! And of course the Church has been a major factor
throughout the history of the west. But some who speak of the uniqueness of Christian civilization do not merely mean to say, uncontroversially, that it is unique, but to make the substantial claim that it is morally superior to all other civilizations. van Inwagen wisely does not make
this claim which is, as he says, highly controversial and "could be
argued interminably" (233). He does however imply that but for
Christianity science would never have come about. This is a highly
debateable view that some (such as A.N. Whitehead) have suggested,
but that others have rejected, seeing the origins of modern science in a
confluence of cultures made possible by the Renaissance recovery of the
spirit of free enquiry. But this is a big historical debate which it would
not be appropriate to pursue here.
van Inwagen holds that the Church is "the unique [meaning the one
and only] instrument of salvation" (237). He then takes up the obvious
challenge, " 'Well, isn't it fortunate for you that you just happen to be a
member of this "unique instrument of salvation" ' ... Yes [he answers], it
is fortunate for me, very fortunate indeed" (238). He then, like Planting a,
seeks to dispose of the problem with an analogy. He points out that
whilst "one's adherence to a system of political thought and action is
conditioned by one's upbringing", this is not "a reason for doubting that
the political system one favors as-if not the uniquely 'correct' oneclearly and markedly superior to its available rivals. And yet any argument to show that the Church's belief in her own uniqueness was arrogant would apply a fortiori to this universally held belief about politics"
(238). But has van Inwagen not here overlooked the crucial differences?
The Church has traditionally claimed to be "the uniquely 'correct' one",
in the sense of being the sole instrument of salvation. The Church's
claim is not about the relative merits of different political systems but
about the eternal fate of the entire human race. One can accept that a
loving God leaves humans free to devise their own political systems, but
can one suppose that the Heavenly Father, who loves all human beings
with an equal and unlimited love, has ordained that only those who
have the good fortune to be born in certain parts of the world shall have
the opportunity of salvation? Is there not a major problem here that is
merely concealed by the analogy with political systems?
That there is such a problem is implicitly acknowledged when van
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Inwagen goes on to say that "It is not necessary for Christians to believe
that there is no salvation outside the visible Church" (239). Indeed, only
one "who has accepted Christian belief and rejects it and rejects it still at
the moment of his death-and rejects it with a clear mind, and not when
maddened by pain or grief or terror-is damned" (239). Such people
must, fortunately, form a very minute group. But "What provision God
makes for those who have never heard the Christian message, or who
have heard it only in some distorted and falsifying form, I do not know.
That is God's business and not ours." (239).
This is a standard, indeed classic, evasion of the problem. It covers virtually everyone throughout the world and throughout history other than
a soundly orthodox Christian minority. But if only God knows what provision God has made for the large majority of the human race, how does
van Inwagen know that God has not caused the Buddhist Sangha, and the
Muslim Ummah, and so on, as well as the Christian Church, to come into
existence as "instruments of salvation," and how does he know that each
community's (including the Church's) affirmation of the unique religious
superiority of its own faith is not an expression of our fallen human
nature? How can he profess a genuine ignorance about God's ways with
the hundreds of millions of people of other faiths, and at the same time
be entitled to assert a dogmatic Christian exclusivism? Surely, if anyone
knows that God is not working salvifically through other religions, as
well as through Christianity, non est van Inwagen!
The next essay is Joseph Runzo's "Perceiving God, World-Views, and
Faith: Meeting the Problem of Religious Pluralism". Since Runzo is an advocate of religious pluralism, though of a different version from my own, I
shall not treat this as the place to discuss our intra-pluralist differences.
The final essay is George Mavrodes' "Polytheism." At the outset the
reader is faced with what appears to be either an extravagent compliment or an splendid insult! Hick is, says Mavrodes, "probably the most
important philosophical defender of polytheism in the history of
Western philosophy" (262). He adds "I think that [Hick] does not much
care for that description himself" (262). He is right about this. But the
appropriateness of the label in one limited sense and its inappropriateness in other senses is easily clarified and need not detain us long. One
who accepts the distinction between, on the one hand, an ultimate and
(in Kantian terms) noumenal Real an sieh, and on the other hand its phenomenal appearances to human consciousness as the experienced godfigures (Jahweh, Allah, Holy Trinity, Shiva, etc) and experienced nonpersonal absolutes (Brahman, the Dharmakaya, the Tao, etc), is at one
level a poly-something, though not precisely a poly-theist, and at another level a mono-something, though not precisely a mono-theist. So the
"polytheist" attribution requires a somewhat contrived hermeneutic,
and I shall take Mavrodes' compliment/insult as a friendly jest. It could
even turn out, in view of Mavrodes' interesting and original discussion
of polytheism in the ordinary sense of that word, and his qualified
defense of it-he thinks that "there are many beings who satisfy
Swinburne's definition of a god" (278)-that it is he who has become the
main defender of polytheism in western philosophy!
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But Mavrodes also has important things to say about the pluralistic
hypothesis. He is interested in a "deep ambiguity in Hick's way of
thinking about the relation of the Real to the gods" (272). He describes
two different and mutually incompatible models or analogies for this
relationship. One is the disguise model. A prince, wishing to observe his
people without their being aware of his presence, travels amongst them
disguised in different ways, sometimes as a mendicant monk, sometimes as a journeyman stonemason, and so on. Thus the same person,
the prince, appears to different groups in different ways, presenting
himself to some as a monk, to others as a stonemason, etc. The analogous possibility in relation to the Real is that the various gods and
absolutes are each identical with the Real, which however takes these
different forms in relation to different human groups. Here the diversity
is all the work of the Real, with no special input on the part of the
human perceivers. Mavrodes' alternative analogy is that of several
artists painting the same landscape. But because they paint in abstract
and nonrepresentational styles one painting does not look much like
another and none looks much like the landscape itself; for the artists'
creative powers result in their producing very different aesthetic constructs. Analogously, the gods and absolutes are not identical with the
Real, but each "is a human creation in reaction to some influence, input, or
the like from the noumenon" (272. Italics original). And Mavrodes asks,
which of these models am I using?
The answer is, neither. The disguise model, first, would be radically
misleading. As Mavrodes points out, "according to this model, there is
just one god who appears in all the various religions" (276). Presumably
that one god, like the prince in the story, has his/her own definite,
describable characteristics, including the intention to appear in a variety
of ways. But such a god is not analogous to the postulated ineffable Real.
This has no humanly conceivable intrinsic characteristics (other than purely formal, linguistically generated ones), and is accordingly not a person
carrying out a revelatory plan. And the construct model is also radically
misleading, though in one respect less so. It suggests that as the artists
directly perceive the landscape, and then through their own creativity
represent it in their different ways, so religious people directly experience
the Real but respond to it by creating different concepts/images/mental
pictures of it. But on the pluralistic hypothesis, as I have tried to formulate
it, there can be no direct experience of the Real an sich which could then be
imaged in a range of ways analogous to that in which the painters creatively represent the landscape. On the contrary, in religious awareness
the organizing and form-giving activity of the mind operates at a pre-conscious level, so that religious (including mystical) experience already
comes to consciousness as the awareness of a specific personal god or
non-personal absolute. The Real is thus not experienced as it is in itself,
but is postulated to satisfy (a) the basic faith that human religious experience is not purely projection but is at the same time a response to a transcendent reality or realities, and (b) the observation that Christianity,
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism etc, which are communal responses to these
different gods and absolutes, seem to be more or less equally effective
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contexts of human transformation from self-centeredness, with all the
evils and miseries that flow from this, to a recentering in the Transcendent
as experienced within one's own tradition.
But Mavrodes' two models do nevertheless each single out an aspect
of the pluralistic hypothesis. The disguise model points to their being
only one Real, whose impact upon us is experienced in different ways.
And the construct model points to the positive contribution of the
human mind in all awareness. The general truth that the form in which
we perceive our environment, both natural and supernatural, depends
upon the nature of our cognitive equipment and conceptual resources,
suggests another analogy which, although still capable of misleading, is
less so than Mavrodes'.
This is the difference between, say, the wooden table top that we
experience as a solid, hard, brown, partly shiny, enduring three-dimensional object, and the account of it given by the physicists, as (very
roughly) mostly empty space in which infinitesimal packages of discharging energy are moving about at a great pace, none of these having
any of the properties of the table top that we perceive-neither colour
nor weight nor extension nor density nor even fixed position. Let us
now add other non-human observers-say angels, Martians, and Alpha
Centaurians,-each species being equipped with quite different sensors
and processing the input of those sensors through their own quite different conceptual systems. Let us suppose that as a result of this each
species perceives something quite different both from what the others
perceive and also from the table top that we perceive. This now provides
a partial analogy for the way in which different spiritual practices (1Thou prayer, non-I-Thou meditation) and different sets of religious concepts lead to very different awarenesses of the Transcendent. But even
this more far-fetched analogy would be only some degree less misleading than Mavrodes', for it still does not reach to the notion of the ineffable. There can indeed be no true analogy for the unique relationship
between the postulated ultimate, ineffable, reality the universal presence
of which gives rise, in collaboration with the our human spiritual practices and conceptual schemes, to the range of forms of religious experience reported in the history of religions.
The purpose of this paper, however, has not been to expound a particular version of religious pluralism, but to suggest that we do not yet
have any adequate response from conservative Christian philosophers
to the problem of religious diversity.lO
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